Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh Diplomacy Masks a Real AI Governance Gap

Vietnam’s Historical Soft Power Strategy in Europe

The June 2025 commemorations held in Paris were not spontaneous civic gatherings. They were coordinated, state-sponsored events designed to reinforce Vietnam’s anti-colonial narrative with a Western European audience—specifically France and, by extension, the EU institutions headquartered nearby in Brussels. The messaging was deliberate: Vietnam is a country with roots in Western civilization’s political discourse, not an outsider seeking entry.

This is a well-rehearsed tool in Hanoi’s diplomatic kit. By anchoring Vietnam’s identity to a globally recognized figure who spent years in Paris, London, and Moscow, the government positions itself as cosmopolitan, historically literate, and institutionally serious. For an EU audience increasingly attentive to digital sovereignty and responsible AI, the subtext is: Vietnam is a trustworthy partner. The strategy works in the short term because historical narratives are difficult to challenge in a diplomatic setting. But they are also unfalsifiable—and that is precisely their limitation when the subject turns to tech governance.

The Gap Between Narrative and Modern Governance

While Hanoi invests political capital in Parisian commemoration halls, its domestic AI policy architecture remains unfinished. Vietnam does not yet have a standalone, enforceable AI law. The government’s 2021 National Strategy for Research, Development, and Application of Artificial Intelligence set targets through 2030 but stopped short of creating binding compliance requirements for companies deploying AI systems.

A 2026 institutional reform push—part of a broader administrative overhaul—was expected to address this, but as of mid-2025 the reform has produced reorganization of ministries rather than published, operable AI regulation. The Oxford Internet Institute’s 2024 Global AI Governance Index ranked Vietnam below both Thailand and the Philippines on policy implementation readiness, noting the absence of an independent AI oversight body. That gap is not hypothetical: South Korean chipmaker SK Hynix, which operates a packaging plant in Vietnam, has flagged that data-handling ambiguity in Vietnam’s current legal framework required bilateral negotiation rather than reliance on domestic statute—an added cost and delay other manufacturing hubs do not impose.

The contrast is structural. Historical diplomacy projects continuity and legitimacy. AI governance requires current, written, enforceable rules. Vietnam is producing the first while deferring the second.

Soft Power as Cover for Policy Lag

Vietnam is not unique in using historical identity as a diplomatic surrogate for institutional readiness. But the pattern carries specific risk in the AI era. As the EU’s AI Act enters enforcement phases and trading partners begin requiring governance reciprocity, countries without credible domestic frameworks face growing friction—regardless of how warmly received their ambassadors are in Paris.

For multinational tech firms, the operational question is concrete: can a company deploying a customer-facing AI system in Vietnam rely on a clear liability framework if the model causes harm? Currently, the answer is no. Vietnam’s existing legal instruments—scattered across its Cybersecurity Law, e-transactions regulations, and draft personal data protection decree—do not form a coherent AI governance architecture. Legal advisories from firms including Baker McKenzie’s Ho Chi Minh City office have noted that clients must currently conduct jurisdiction-specific risk assessments that other ASEAN markets, including Singapore and increasingly Thailand, no longer require at the same granular level.

That compliance friction is a quiet competitive disadvantage. It does not appear in diplomatic communiqués celebrating 115 years of revolutionary heritage. But it does appear in investment timelines.

Implications for Regional AI Competition

Vietnam’s governance lag is not permanent—but its timing matters. The ASEAN AI governance race is compressing. Thailand published its National AI Policy 2022–2027 with dedicated enforcement mechanisms. Singapore’s Model AI Governance Framework has been through two iterations and is referenced in third-country bilateral agreements. Even the Philippines enacted a Data Governance Act in 2023 that provides a more legible baseline than Vietnam currently offers.

The window for Vietnam to position itself as a regional AI governance anchor is narrowing. Each quarter without a published, enforceable framework is a quarter in which regional competitors lock in R&D partnerships and pilot agreements with the EU and US that Vietnam cannot yet credibly offer. Historical soft power builds goodwill; it does not substitute for legal clarity when a board-level compliance officer reviews a market entry decision.

The more durable risk is reputational inversion: if Vietnam continues projecting institutional sophistication internationally while domestic governance lags, the gap becomes a credibility story rather than a policy story—and that is harder to close.

Key Takeaways

• Soft power ≠ governance readiness: Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh commemorations in France signal diplomatic confidence, not institutional AI maturity.
• Enforcement gap is documented: The Oxford Internet Institute’s 2024 ranking placed Vietnam below Thailand and the Philippines on AI policy implementation; no standalone AI law exists.
• Compliance friction is real: Foreign operators—including SK Hynix—face bilateral negotiation to resolve ambiguities that clearer frameworks in peer markets resolve by statute.
• Window is closing: Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines are advancing frameworks; each passing quarter narrows Vietnam’s opportunity to anchor regional AI governance leadership.